United States Grand Prix - Discussion

[Dylan]

A letter from Paul Stoddart

Much has been said about the farce that occurred on Sunday, June 19, in Indianapolis, and I feel that in the interests of transparency, it would be worthwhile for someone who was actually present, and participated in the discussions leading up to the start of the Grand Prix, to provide a truthful account of what took place, both for the 100,000-plus fans who were present, and for the hundreds of millions of people watching on television around the world.

While this is a genuine attempt to provide a factual timeline of the relevant events that took place, should any minor detail or sequence be disputed, it will not, in my opinion, affect in any way this account of events that led up to arguably the most damaging spectacle in the recent history of Formula One.

Background

For those who have not followed the recent political developments in Formula One, it is fair to say that, for over a year now, the majority of teams have felt at odds with the actions of the FIA and its President, Max Mosley, concerning the regulations, and the way in which those regulations have been introduced, or are proposed to be introduced. Not a weekend has gone by where some, or all, of the teams are not discussing or disputing these regulations. This is so much the case that it is common knowledge the manufacturers have proposed their own series commencing January 1, 2008, and this is supported by at least two of the independent teams. The general perception is that, in many instances, these issues have become personal, and it is my opinion that was a serious contributory factor to the failure to find a solution that would have allowed all 20 cars to compete in Sunday's United States Grand Prix.

The Facts

Friday, June 17

I noticed that Ricardo Zonta's Toyota had stopped, but in all honesty, did not pay any attention to the reasons why; however, I actually witnessed Ralf Schumacher's accident, both on the monitors, and more significantly, I could see what took place from my position on the pit wall. This necessitated a red flag, and in the numerous replays on the monitors, it looked very much like the cause of the accident was a punctured rear tyre.

Throughout the afternoon, numerous people in the paddock suggested it was a tyre failure and commented that it was similar to the serious accident which befell Ralf Schumacher during the 2004 US Grand Prix. Later that evening was the first time I was aware of a potential problem with the Michelin tyres at this event. In all honesty, I didn't pay a great deal of attention, as our team is on Bridgestone tyres.

Saturday, June 18

On arriving at the circuit, the word throughout the paddock was that there was a potential problem with the rear tyres supplied to all Michelin teams for this event, and it became evident as the first and second sessions were run that most of the affected teams were being very conservative with the amount of on-track running they were doing. In addition, Toyota announced that it had substituted Ricardo Zonta for Ralf Schumacher, who would take no further part in the event. Speculation was rife in the paddock that some Michelin teams might not take part in qualifying. Also, during the practice session, I was informed there would be a Team Principals' meeting with Bernie Ecclestone at 1430 hrs after qualifying, which I incorrectly assumed would centre around the Michelin issue.

Qualifying took place, and indeed, all 20 cars qualified for Sunday's Grand Prix.

At approximately 1420 hrs, I attended Bernie's office, and with representatives present from all other teams, including Ferrari, the meeting commenced. Surprisingly, the main topic of conversation was the number of events and calendar for 2006, followed by a suggestion that a meeting be convened at the next Grand Prix to discuss two issues only – firstly, a proposal for a single-tyre supplier in Formula One, and secondly, whether or not it would be desirable to qualify with or without a race fuel load in 2006. Only at the very end of the meeting did the Michelin tyre issue arise, and in fairness, it was not discussed in any great detail. I personally found this strange, but as I have stated, it did not affect Minardi directly, and therefore I had no reason to pursue the matter.

Throughout Saturday evening, there was considerable speculation in the paddock that the tyre issue was much more serious than at first thought, and people were talking about a fresh shipment of tyres being flown overnight from France, and what penalty the Michelin teams would take should those tyres be used. By the time I left the paddock, people were taking bets on Minardi and Jordan scoring points!

Later that evening, I checked with our Sporting Director on what developments had occurred, and was told that the issue was indeed very serious, and the possibility existed that the Michelin teams would not take part in the race.

Sunday, June 19

I arrived at the circuit at 0815 hrs, only to find the paddock was buzzing with stories suggesting the Michelin teams would be unable to take part in the Grand Prix. I was then handed a copy of correspondence between Michelin, the FIA, and the Michelin teams that revealed the true extent of the problem. By now, journalists were asking if Minardi would agree to a variation of the regulations to allow the Michelin teams to compete, and what penalties I felt would be appropriate.

A planned Minardi press briefing took place at 0930 hrs, and as it was ending, I was summoned to an urgent meeting, along with Jordan, with Bernie Ecclestone, the two most senior Michelin representatives present at the circuit, IMS President Tony George, Team Principals, and technical representatives from the Michelin teams. At this meeting, Michelin, to its credit, admitted that the tyres available were unable to complete a race distance around the Indianapolis circuit without a change to the track configuration, so as to reduce the speed coming out of the last turn onto the banking. Much background information was provided as to the enormous efforts that Michelin, with support from its teams, had undertaken in the preceding 48 hours to try and resolve the problem, but it was clear that all those efforts had failed to produce a suitable solution that wouldn't involve support from the non-Michelin teams, and ultimately, the FIA.

What was requested of the Bridgestone teams was to allow a chicane to be constructed at Turn 13, which would then allow Michelin to advise their teams that, in their opinion, the tyres would be able to complete the race distance. It was made very clear that this was the only viable option available, as previous suggestions from the FIA, such as speed-limiting the Michelin cars through Turn 13, could, and probably would, give rise to a monumental accident. This idea, as well as one concerning the possibility of pit stops every 10 laps, were dismissed, and discussion returned to the only sensible solution – a chicane. During this discussion, a technical representative with specific knowledge of the Indianapolis circuit, together with representatives from IMS, were tasked with preparing the design of a chicane, and Bernie Ecclestone agreed to speak with the one Team Principal not present, Mr Todt, and to inform the FIA President, Max Mosley, who was not present at Indianapolis, of the planned solution to allow the successful running of the US Grand Prix. With only a few hours now remaining to the start of the race, we agreed to reconvene as soon as Bernie had responses from Messrs Todt and Mosley.

(continued in next post)

[Dylan]

At approximately 1055 hrs, Bernie informed us that not only would Mr Todt not agree, stating that it was not a Ferrari problem, but an FIA and a Michelin problem, but also Mr Mosley had stated that if any attempts were made to alter the circuit, he would cancel the Grand Prix forthwith. These words had a familiar tone to me, as they were similar to those I had heard around midnight on the Friday preceding the 2005 Australian Grand Prix, when I was told by all the senior FIA representatives present that the Australian Grand Prix would be cancelled forthwith if I did not withdraw pending legal action between Minardi and the FIA. Once again, Mr Mosley was not present at that Grand Prix! It is fair to say at this point that the vast majority of people present in the room both felt and stated that Mr Mosley had completely overstepped the mark, had no idea whatsoever of the gravity of the situation, and furthermore, cared even less about the US Grand Prix, its organisers, the fans, and indeed, the hundreds of millions of television viewers around the world who were going to be affected by his intransigence.

By this time, the nine teams had discussed running a non-championship race, or a race in which the Michelin teams could not score points, and even a race whereby only the Michelin teams used the new chicane, and indeed, every other possible option that would allow 20 cars to participate and put on a show, thereby not causing the enormous damage to Formula One that all those present knew would otherwise occur.

By now, most present felt the only option was to install the chicane and race, if necessary, without Ferrari, but with 18 cars, in what would undoubtedly be a non-championship race. We discussed with Bernie the effects of the FIA withdrawing its staff, and agreed among ourselves a Race Director, a Safety Car driver, and other essential positions, and all agreed that, under the circumstances, what was of paramount importance was that the race must go ahead. All further agreed that since we would most likely be denied FIA facilities, such as scales and post-race scrutineering, every competitor would instruct his team and drivers to conduct themselves in the spirit of providing an entertaining race for the good of Formula One.

At this point, we called for all 20 drivers, and indeed, all 20 arrived, at which point we informed them of our plan. While I cannot testify that each and every driver agreed with what we were proposing, what I can say with certainty is that no driver disagreed, and indeed, members of the Grand Prix Drivers' Association discussed overseeing the construction of a suitable chicane. Jean Todt was the only significant team individual not present, and the Ferrari drivers stated this decision was up to Mr Todt.

I feel it is important to stress that, at this stage, and mindful of the total impossibility – call it force majeure if you wish – of 14 cars being able to compete in the race, the nine teams represented agreed they would not take part in the race unless a solution was found in the interests of Formula One as a global sport, as it was clear to all present that the sport, and not the politics, had to prevail if we were to avoid an impending disaster.

After a short break, we reconvened without the drivers. When I arrived in Bernie's office, Flavio Briatore was on the telephone to Mr Mosley, and it was quite clear from the body language of the others gathered in the room that Mr Mosley was having none of our suggestions. At the conclusion of the telephone call, it was obvious that many of those in the room had lost all faith in Mr Mosley and his ability to perform his function as President of the FIA in respect of Formula One matters.

I'm sure this sentence will be treated with contempt by Mr Mosley, but what must be realised is that there are various reasons that other Team Principals, and the most senior people in Formula One, will not say publicly what they openly feel privately about Mr Mosley, his politics and his governance of the sport. There is a great temptation to go into those reasons in detail, but that is for another day. Suffice to say, those gathered at Indianapolis felt Mr Mosley, and to a lesser degree, the lack of co-operation from Mr Todt, were about to be responsible for the greatest FIAsco in Formula One's recent history.

Discussions then took place concerning the other telephone calls with Mr Mosley from, among others, Bernie Ecclestone, Ron Dennis and Tony George, and it was clearly revealed to what extent Mr Mosley was prepared to go in order to achieve his aims. To my total disgust, it was stated that Mosley had informed Mr Martin, the FIA's most senior representative in the USA, that if any kind of non-championship race was run, or any alteration made to the circuit, the US Grand Prix, and indeed, all FIA-regulated motorsport in the US, would be under threat – again, exactly the same tactic that was used in threatening the Australian Grand Prix and Australian motorsport in March of this year.

By now, it was evident Mosley had bullied the US Grand Prix promoter into submission, Bernie Ecclestone was powerless to intervene, and all efforts of the Team Principals, with the exception of Jean Todt, had failed to save the 2005 US Grand Prix.

At this point, the pit lane had opened and a hasty discussion took place concerning whether or not the Michelin teams would go to the grid. A radio had been delivered to me by team personnel at this stage, and I was able to know which cars were going to the grid. It is interesting to note that the Jordan Team Principal was not present at this time, and indeed, it was the Jordans that first proceeded to the grid, followed by the Ferraris. After discussion with Bernie Ecclestone, it was agreed the Michelin teams would go to the grid, but were absolutely prevented from participating in the race because of the tyre situation.

We then proceeded to the grid, at which point I asked Jordan's Colin Kolles if he intended to stand by the other teams or participate in the race. In no uncertain terms, I was told Jordan would be racing. I was also approached by a Bridgestone representative, who informed me that Bridgestone wished us to race. This left me with one of the most difficult decisions I have had to take during my time in F1, as I did not want to race, but given my current relationship with Mr Mosley, felt certain heavy sanctions would follow if I did not. I made it clear to Bernie Ecclestone, and several Team Principals, that if the Jordans either went off or retired, I would withdraw the Minardi cars from the race.

It is important for people to realise that Minardi, the seven Michelin teams, Bernie Ecclestone, and the promoters did not agree with Mr Mosley's tactics. For the reasons previously outlined, it may take some considerable time, if ever, for this to be admitted, but there is no question in my mind that the farce that occurred on Sunday, June 19, 2005 at Indianapolis was the responsibility of the FIA President, Max Mosley, and compounded by the lack of support from Jean Todt.

For the avoidance of doubt, in my opinion, Michelin was responsible enough to admit that the problem was of their creation. When one considers that even the replacement, Barcelona-specification tyres that were shipped to IMS, when tested, apparently exhibited the same characteristics as those that originally failed, this clearly is a case of force majeure, as I do not for a moment believe that Michelin intentionally brought tyres to the event that were unsuitable for competition.

Far more importantly, however, Mosley refused to accept any of the solutions offered, and that refusal was, I believe, politically motivated. Therefore, I feel he failed in his duty, and that is why I have called for his resignation.

Much discussion and debate will undoubtedly take place over the coming weeks and months, but I believe this is a truthful and honest account of the facts, and not the fiction, surrounding the responsibility for this FIAsco. People can now make up their own minds!

[Javed]

Yeah I read that too, he is right about Mosley though, that guys a toss.

[^^v]

ahahahah .. one thing i like bout Stoddart..
not afraid to speak his mind... or swear

[Hondavirgin]

damn it, i had a huge rant typed and them my internet crashed!!!!!!!!!!

Listening to stoddart and thinking he is fair and unbiased is like watching Today Tonight and thinking it is fair and unbiased reporting.

Everyone complains when F1 is run like a business, then when it is run like a sport and rules enforced some ppl complain that they didn't get a show. Its a sport not a circus show.

[Hondavirgin]

Double post i know, but i thought this was a good balancer to Stoddart's rant.

I think this comment says it all:

Should you not have just forgotten about the rules and put on a show for the fans?
"You cannot do that if you wish to remain a sport. Formula One is a sport which entertains. It is not entertainment disguised as sport.



Q&A with Max Mosley
FIA President gives his view of the US GP





The moment the US GP descended into farce
What follows is a press release from the FIA in which Max Mosley answers questions on the events on the US Grand Prix, during before and after...

What about the American fans who travelled long distances and spent a lot of money to see a race with only six cars?
"My personal view, and it is only my personal view, is that Michelin should offer to compensate the fans on a fair basis and ask the Indianapolis Motor Speedway to coordinate this. Then Tony George and Bernie Ecclestone should jointly announce that the US Grand Prix will take place at Indianapolis in 2006 and that anyone who had a ticket this year would be entitled to the same ticket free-of-charge next year. But I emphasise, that’s just my personal view."


Should you not have just forgotten about the rules and put on a show for the fans?
"You cannot do that if you wish to remain a sport. Formula One is a sport which entertains. It is not entertainment disguised as sport. But even more importantly Formula One is a dangerous activity and it would be most unwise to make fundamental changes to a circuit without following tried and tested procedures. What happened was bad, but it can be put right. This is not true of a fatality."

Why did you refuse the request of some of the teams to install a chicane?
"The decision was taken (quite rightly in my view) by the FIA officials on the spot and notified to the teams on the Saturday evening. I did not learn about it until Sunday morning European time. They refused the chicane because it would have been unfair, against the rules and potentially dangerous."

Why unfair?
"Because modern Formula One cars are specially prepared for each circuit. To change radically a circuit like Indianapolis, which has very particular characteristics, would be a big disadvantage to the teams which had brought correct equipment to the event."

Is this why Ferrari objected?
"No, Ferrari had nothing whatever to do with the decision. They were never consulted. Ferrari, Jordan and Minardi, as the Bridgestone teams, were not involved."

Why would a chicane have been unfair, it would have been the same for everyone?
"No. The best analogy I can give is a downhill ski race. Suppose half the competitors at a downhill race arrive with short slalom skis instead of long downhill skis and tell the organiser to change the course because it would be dangerous to attempt the downhill with their short skis. They would be told to ski down more slowly. To make the competitors with the correct skis run a completely different course to suit those with the wrong skis would be contrary to basic sporting fairness."

Never mind about ski-ing, what about Formula One?
"Okay, but it’s the same from a purely motor racing point of view. Suppose some time in the future we have five teams with engines from major car companies and seven independent teams with engines from a commercial engine builder (as in the past). Imagine the seven independent teams all have an oil surge problem in Turn 13 due to a basic design fault in their engines. They would simply be told to drop their revs or slow down. There would be no question of a chicane."

All right, but why against the rules, surely you can change a circuit for safety reasons?
"There was no safety issue with the circuit. The problem was some teams had brought the wrong tyres. It would be like making all the athletes in a 100m sprint run barefoot because some had forgotten their shoes."



Meeting after meeting came up with nothing...
How can you say a chicane would be “potentially dangerous” when most of the teams wanted it for safety reasons?
"A chicane would completely change the nature of the circuit. It would involve an extra session of very heavy braking on each lap, for which the cars had not been prepared. The circuit would also not have been inspected and homologated with all the simulations and calculations which modern procedures require. Suppose there had been a fatal accident – how could we have justified such a breach of our fundamental safety procedures to an American court?"

But it’s what the teams wanted.
"It’s what some of the teams wanted because they thought it might suit their tyres. They wanted it because they knew they could not run at full speed on the proper circuit. We cannot break our own rules just because some of the teams want us to."

Why did the FIA stop the teams using a different tyre flown in specially from France?
"It is completely untrue that we stopped them. We told them they could use the tyre, but that the stewards would undoubtedly penalise them to ensure they gained no advantage from breaking the rules by using a high-performance short-life tyre just for qualifying. We also had to make sure this did not set a precedent. However the question became academic, because Michelin apparently withdrew the tyre after trying it on a test rig."

Michelin were allowed to bring two types of tyre – why did they not have a back-up available?
"You would have to ask Michelin. Tyre companies usually bring an on- the-limit race tyre and a more conservative back-up which, although slower, is there to provide a safety net if there are problems."

Is it true that you wrote to both tyre companies asking them to make sure their tyres were safe?
"Yes, we wrote on 1 June and both replied positively. The letter was prompted by incidents in various races in addition to rumours of problems in private testing."

So, having refused to install a chicane, what did the FIA suggest the Michelin teams should do?
"We offered them three possibilities. First, to use the type of tyre they qualified on but with the option to change the troublesome left rear whenever necessary. Tyre changes are allowed under current rules provided they are for genuine safety reasons, which would clearly have been the case here. Secondly, to use a different tyre – but this became academic when Michelin withdrew it as already explained. Thirdly, to run at reduced speed through Turn 13, as Michelin had requested."

How can you expect a racing driver to run at reduced speed through a corner?
"They do it all the time and that is exactly what Michelin requested. If they have a puncture they reduce their speed until they can change a wheel; if they have a brake problem they adjust their driving to overcome it. They also adjust their speed and driving technique to preserve tyres and brakes when their fuel load is heavy. Choosing the correct speed is a fundamental skill for a racing driver."

But that would have been unfair, surely some would have gone through the corner faster than others?
"No, Michelin wanted their cars slowed in Turn 13. They could have given their teams a maximum speed. We offered to set up a speed trap and show a black and orange flag to any Michelin driver exceeding the speed limit. He would then have had to call in the pits – effectively a drive-through penalty."

How would a driver know what speed he was doing?
"His team would tell him before the race the maximum revs he could run in a given gear in Turn 13. Some might even have been able to give their driver an automatic speed limiter like they use in the pit lane."

But would this be real racing?
"It would make no difference to the race between the Michelin cars. Obviously the Bridgestone cars would have had an advantage, but this would have been as a direct result of having the correct tyres for the circuit on which everyone had previously agreed to race."

Did the Michelin teams have any other way of running the race if the circuit itself was unchanged?
"Yes, they could have used the pit lane on each lap. The pit lane is part of the circuit. This would have avoided Turn 13 altogether. It is difficult to understand why none of them did this, because 7th and 8th places were certainly available, plus others if any of the six Bridgestone runners did not finish. There were points available which might change the outcome of the World Championship."

But that would have looked very strange – could you call that a race?
"It would seem strange, but it would absolutely have been a race for the 14 cars concerned. And they would all have been at full speed for most of each lap. That would have been a show for the fans, certainly infinitely better than what happened."

Did not Michelin tell them quite simply not to race at all?
"No. Michelin said speed must be reduced in Turn 13. They were apparently not worried about the rest of the circuit and certainly not about the pit lane, where a speed limit applies. If the instruction had been not to race at all, there would have been no point in asking for a chicane."

Didn’t the Michelin teams offer to run for no points?
"I believe so, but why should the Bridgestone teams suddenly find they had gone all the way to America to run in a non-Championship race? It would be like saying there could be no medals in the Olympic rowing because some countries had brought the wrong boats."

What about running the race with the chicane but with points only for the Bridgestone teams?
"This would start to enter the world of the circus, but even then the race would have been open to the same criticisms on grounds of fairness and safety as a Championship race run with a chicane. It would have been unfair on Bridgestone teams to finish behind Michelin teams on a circuit which had been specially adapted to suit the Michelin low-speed tyres to the detriment of Bridgestone’s high- speed tyres, and the circuit would no longer have met the rules."

Have you ordered Michelin to produce details of all recent tyre failures as reported on a website?
"We cannot order Michelin to do anything. We have no contractual relationship with them. Their relationship is with the teams. However, we have an excellent understanding with both tyre companies and with many of the teams’ other suppliers. We find they always help us with technical information when we ask them."

Wouldn’t Formula One be better if one body were responsible for the commercial side as well as the sport?
"No, this is precisely what the competition law authorities in many parts of the world seek to avoid. It is not acceptable to them that the international governing body should have the right both to sanction and to promote. This would potentially enable it to further its own financial interests to the detriment of competitors and organisers. Apart from the legal aspect there would be an obvious and very undesirable conflict of interest if a body charged with administering a dangerous sport had to consider the financial consequences of a decision taken for safety reasons.. You can be responsible for the sport or for the money, but not both."



A US Grand Prix F1 would like to forget
Didn’t this entire problem arise because new regulations require one set of tyres to last for qualifying and the race?
"No. The tyre companies have no difficulty making tyres last. The difficult bit is making a fast tyre last. There is always a compromise between speed and reliability. There have been one or two cases this season of too much speed and not enough reliability. Indianapolis was the most recent and worst example."

Finally, what’s going to happen on June 29 in Paris?
"We will listen carefully to what the teams have to say. There are two sides to every story and the seven teams must have a full opportunity to tell theirs. The atmosphere will be calm and polite. The World Motor Sport Council members come from all over the world and will undoubtedly take a decision that is fair and balanced."

E.A.
Source FIA

[nEUROtic]

Stoddarts Rant is so much more credible. Mosely blatantly denies that "Minardi, Jordan, OR Ferrari were involved". Funny stoddart seems to know so much, and was present in all meetings.

Also Mosely says that it was the FIA stewards that made the decision of no chicane, and Saturday night the teams were informed. Stoddart moves it more towards Sunday, and Mosely being the ultimate decision maker.

I found it funny that bernie seemed to be on their side in Stoddarts report, Considering how well those two get along.

But yeah, Mosely is full of shit

[Hondavirgin]

Stoddarts Rant is so much more credible. Mosely blatantly denies that "Minardi, Jordan, OR Ferrari were involved". Funny stoddart seems to know so much, and was present in all meetings.

Also Mosely says that it was the FIA stewards that made the decision of no chicane, and Saturday night the teams were informed. Stoddart moves it more towards Sunday, and Mosely being the ultimate decision maker.

I found it funny that bernie seemed to be on their side in Stoddarts report, Considering how well those two get along.

But yeah, Mosely is full of shit

because Stoddart doesn't have an axe to grind with Mosely and the FIA? He's already well and truly shown he has a blatant disregard for the rules of the sport with his australian antics. If it was Frank Williams, Ron Dennis, Briatore, hell, anyone else i'd give it cred.

Regardless of all the other nonsense, that quote i highlighted is still 100% true, its sport that entertains, not entertainment dressed as sport (if we wanted that i'd watch WWF).

[Dylan]

because Stoddart doesn't have an axe to grind with Mosely and the FIA? He's already well and truly shown he has a blatant disregard for the rules of the sport with his australian antics. If it was Frank Williams, Ron Dennis, Briatore, hell, anyone else i'd give it cred.

Regardless of all the other nonsense, that quote i highlighted is still 100% true, its sport that entertains, not entertainment dressed as sport (if we wanted that i'd watch WWF).

And Max Mosely dosen't have an axe to grind with the group of nine? (which all apart from Jordan were affected in a negative way).

You may want to know that, although it appears that the Max Mosely thing is an "interview", it really isn't. The questions were specificaly chosen by Max and answers, therefore he could avoid any tough questions. Also, why does he keep making reference to other sports. Mabey he should focus more on Formula 1, which is entirely different from most other sports.

It appears that some people just can't see past the lies of Max Mosely.

Here is a TOTALLY unbiased opinion from Formula 1 Paysite www.autosport-atlas.com (by the way i havent read it all yet so i dont know if it confirms my view - that FIA were in the wrong, or if it says that the FIA were in the right... I will read it when I get home from work)

When Ralf Schumacher hit the wall on Friday at the Indianapolis Motor Speedway, none of the journalists there realised quite what the implications would be, even when it emerged that his teammate Ricardo Zonta had also suffered a left rear failure. I can remember us all getting excited after the first session in Bahrain last year, when there was a series of spectacular punctures on Michelin cars - all raced back to a dodgy kerb, which was subsequently sorted.

Last weekend, the problem seemed slow to gather momentum. Only gradually did we learn that teams other than Toyota had suffered signs of imminent problems with the heavily loaded left rear. What was worrying was that they seemed to involve third cars that had run a lot of laps.

Saturday June 18th

Early on Saturday morning it become apparent that a crisis was looming. The technical directors of the Michelin teams held a summit meeting with the company, and it was decided that in practice teams should run no more than 10 laps on their new sets. I concluded that this was done in part to ensure that, in addition to the new set for qualifying and the race, there was a low mileage back up set on hand should it be required on Sunday.

There also a mandate from Michelin that pressures be run above a certain limit. It was revealed early on that Toyota had been running pressures very low. Indeed, Zonta had been the first man to run a flying lap on Friday, and when he did so it was very apparent that the car was virtually dragging along the ground as it kicked up the dust round the banking. Higher pressures have always been inherently safer, but there's a price to pay in terms of handling.

The other story that began to gather momentum after the meeting concerned the 'Barcelona' tyres. Michelin had only brought two types of tyre to Indy, something that had happened at only one other race this year. At most events there might be up to four or five options chosen by its teams in the weeks before the race. But this time there were only two, and worryingly both types had been implicated. They shared a common construction, and there was clearly no fallback position.

That's when Michelin decided that it was worth calling Clermont-Ferrand and asking for a third type of tyre to be shipped over, pronto, as an emergency measure. The company described these as Barcelona tyres, different in compound (and date of manufacture) to the tyres already in the States, but identical in construction.

These were scheduled to arrive on Sunday, but there was a small problem. There was absolutely nothing in the rules that allowed them to be introduced so late in the weekend. Regulations being challenged included a change to the type of tyres declared and marked up at the start of the weekend, a change on the type chosen for Saturday/Sunday, a change from qualifying to the race, and the use of tyres outside the main allocation of four sets. It was decided to get the tyres on a plane at all costs, and then sort out the detail later.

Nick Shorrock, Director of Michelin F1 Activities; briefs the press Saturday morningSo on Saturday morning, the paying punters got short shrift as the Michelin runners did very few laps in practice, and that included lots of ins and outs and careful checking. It was also obvious that some cars, notably the Williams and Red Bull, really didn't like running the high pressures. Some wondered aloud whether all teams really did stick to the mandated pressures, at least for one-lap qualifying.

A further side issue emerged as a result of this focus. It's been very noticeable this year how pressures drop under a safety car period. Usually that manifests itself in dodgy handling for a couple of laps, but here there were serious concerns that in there could be a failure in the immediate aftermath of a safety car. The Michelin group concluded that a good solution would be to have three laps of 'virtual' safety car, at much higher speeds than those attainable behind a Mercedes, to allow drivers to get their tyres up to pressure. Again, there was nothing in the rules to enable this to happen.

Continued next post

[Dylan]

So already on Saturday morning two major stories were emerging that involved changing or waiving regulations. I wondered how that might work out, so I asked the oracle on these matters.

"The procedure is that ten teams are going to have to agree something," said Minardi's Paul Stoddart. "In the interests of safety I will agree, and let's just say that Jordan and [Ferrari's Jean] Todt agree, the other two Bridgestone runners, you're going to then have [FIA president] Max [Mosley]'s agreement, you're going to have to then have Bernie [Ecclestone]'s agreement, so the 12 Concorde signatories are going to have to agree. Then Max has to request, I believe is the right word, the stewards to go along with it.

"The last time such a request was made people will remember was in Melbourne, when I had 10 signatures, and the stewards turned down such a request. They were sympathetic to it, but it was outside the regulations. This is clearly outside the regulations, so it will be interesting to see what happens.

"I have the greatest sympathy for Michelin, it's a great company, and I have great empathy with the teams that are affected by it. But there's no clear-cut way out of this. Whatever happens, the events that take place in the next few hours here, or perhaps even as much as the next 24 hours, are going to have far reaching ramifications. If something is rushed through because of circumstances, I can't see that not having wider ramifications down the track."

Love him or loath him, the bloke is pretty switched on. And he set me thinking. I could already see that this could all come down to the opinion of one man, someone who is not known to like being backed into a corner. And it wasn't Max Mosley.

Paul StoddartBy chance I bumped into Jean Todt as he went into the Ferrari garage. What did he think of the safety car idea, I wondered?

"I don't talk to Michelin, I only talk to Bridgestone," he grinned. It was was pretty clear that there would be no room for manoeuvre.

There were no obvious Michelin failures during Saturday, and only later did it emerge that, on closer inspection, problems were again developing with some low mileage tyres. Investigations continued at the track, and also elsewhere.

Some of the Friday tyres, damaged and otherwise, had gone to a Michelin facility in South Carolina, for detailed examination. It was vital that Michelin could replicate the failure. The US facility had two test rigs, but neither combined high speed running with the loadings experienced at Indy, so tests were inconclusive.

Things moved quickly on Saturday afternoon. At a routine meeting of the team principals, the question of the 'virtual' safety car was brought up, and Todt made it clear that he would not allow any changes to normal procedures. Jordan's Colin Kolles later told me that he was amazed that there was no wider discussion of the tyre issue, and Stoddart repeated that sentiment in a press statement released on Wednesday.

Through the day, the main focus was on the substitution of the Barcelona tyre. At his regular afternoon press gathering, Ron Dennis said that it would be a sensible solution, and that he'd be prepared to allow the six Bridgestone cars start at the front. Somehow that didn't seem like the sort of compromise that would interest Mr. Todt.

In public there still seemed to be some optimism in the Michelin camp that its investigations would pinpoint a problem - perhaps with a specific batch of the Indy tyres - and that there would be some answers. Pierre Dupasquier said he expected news by 2:00am.

It wasn't reported at the time, but in addition to the work going on in South Carolina, Michelin sent some of the Saturday tyres to a much closer facility in Akron, Ohio. They travelled in style in McLaren's private jet, with the FIA technical delegate, Jo Bauer, chaperoning them in a second plane loaned by Ron Dennis. After all, those used in qualifying were in effect subject to parc ferme rules.

But even while all this work was going on, the goalposts had moved. Late afternoon discussions, and a meeting in the Michelin office, led to a dramatic conclusion. At around 7:00pm I wandered down to the paddock to see if there was any news. These days the place empties quickly on Saturday. Because of parc ferme, the mechanics have nothing to do, and at tracks with a bustling city nearby, there's little reason to stay - usually the only folk left behind are technical directors and race engineers, who are plotting strategy.

So the Indy paddock was indeed eerily quiet, just a few folk sitting at tables here and there, and all of them top management. An approach to a technical director of a Michelin team left me speechless.

Ron Dennis"They're now saying we're only going to race with a chicane," he said. So what about the much-vaunted Barcelona tyres, which were supposed to resolve the situation?

"We can't use those. We don't know anything about them and they have the same construction anyway."

I couldn't believe my ears. A few brief strictly off-the-record chats with team bosses, made easier because I was the only member of the press around, confirmed the story. It really was true, and what worried me most was the air of resignation that everyone shared. They knew that this was serious stuff.

The team bosses were preparing a letter to be delivered to the FIA. When I saw a solemn Ron Dennis marching across the paddock from the Michelin office, speaking on his GSM and clutching a piece of paper, I knew what it was. I also knew it wouldn't be a good time to ask any questions.

The only note of optimism was that most seemed convinced that the chicane would eventually happen. Firstly Bernie Ecclestone wanted it, and secondly it simply had to be there if we were going to have a race. Things always work out in the end, don't they?

I wasn't so sure. For all his influence, and contrary to what many cynics think, Ecclestone cannot impose such big decisions on the officials of the FIA, upon whose shoulders ultimate responsibility for all sporting and regulatory matters lie. My instinct that they had little time for the chicane plan was confirmed when I saw the key people as they left the circuit. It just couldn't be done, was the gist.

However, those guys report to Max Mosley, who was back in Europe. If he agreed with the idea, he had the power to make things happen. It was around 2:00am in Monaco when the Michelin meeting took place, and even Bernie wouldn't call Max that late to sound him out. Nothing could happen until the morning.

The other side of the question was what Ferrari thought. By this time Todt had gone to his hotel, but the rest of his management team were still present. They made it absolutely clear that the idea of a chicane was a complete nonsense, and that rules were black and white.

Anyway, I'd drawn a sample Bus Stop on a handy Indy map in a notebook. A senior member of the Ferrari team took it from me, drew a spectacular Hot Wheels style loop in the middle of Turn 12, and wrote 'Michelin Only' on it.

[Dylan]

It was easy to mock, but perhaps the Ferrari folk hadn't realised quite what could unfold on Sunday. The attitude was that Michelin had screwed up, end of story. And what would happen if Bridgestone had been in similar trouble? They had a good point, as six versus 14 would have been a very different equation. Indeed FIA people shared that concern - what if we build a chicane to please Ferrari? How would that look?

The Michelin teams had put some serious thought into the chicane proposals. Team bosses and technical directors are no mugs, and they knew it had to be done properly. As an ex-driver, BAR sporting director Gil de Ferran offered advice, while McLaren helped to provide some provisional drawings. But when everyone eventually packed up and left, we were still in limbo.

Sunday June 19th

Fast forward to Sunday. The only news from all the Michelin research was bad - it was confirmed that there was no way that the Indy tyres could be raced under normal circumstances. And the Barcelona tyres were still off the menu.

Bernie Ecclestone, Charlie Whiting, Jean TodtMeanwhile an early morning phone call between Mosley and race director Charlie Whiting reaffirmed the FIA's position. Clearly any conversations between Max and Bernie had not produced the result the teams wanted.

Whiting composed a reply to the letter from Michelin requesting a chicane was composed. It basically said a chicane won't happen - why don't you just drive slowly round Turn 13?

This idea wasn't quite as silly as it sounded. Later the FIA told the teams that it would be willing to operate a speed trap, similar to that used in the pitlane. This could be done by asking the FOM technicians responsible for the cabling around the track to create an extra loop at Turn 13. Any driver breaking the speed limit, whatever that might be, would be penalised.

The key advantage of this, according to the FIA, was that it did not involve the Bridgestone runners in any way, unlike a chicane. However, the prospect of having two lanes of traffic running round the banking, with a huge speed differential, did have its drawbacks. Not least the fact that four of the guys in the high-speed lane would be the Minardi/Jordan rookies. How safe would that be?

FIA folk were also somewhat bemused to find that neither Michelin nor the teams had a specific figure for a safe speed limit. That lack of a suitable number was confirmed to me after the race by a leading team technical guy, who said that it was just taken for granted that the chicane would have taken off sufficient speed to make Turn 13 safe.

There was also a feeling in the FIA camp that Michelin didn't know for sure that speed through Turn 13 was the real cause of the problem, although that's not the impression I got from the Michelin camp. Anyway, it seemed to me one of the key aims was to specifically avoid a crash at high speed on the banking. Neutralising that corner would have been a major step in the right direction, even if other areas of the track were still vulnerable.

Gradually folk arriving in the paddock began to realise that something serious was up. The key event was a meeting held in Ecclestone's office in the paddock, which kicked off sometime after 9:00am.

Those in attendance, although not all from the very start, were Tony George (IMS); Pierre Dupasquier and Neil Shorrock (Michelin); Flavio Briatore and Pat Symonds (Renault); Nick Fry and Gil de Ferran (BAR); Sam Michael (Williams); Ron Dennis and Martin Whitmarsh (McLaren); John Howett and Tsutomo Tomita (Toyota); Peter Sauber; Christian Horner and Guenther Steiner (Red Bull); Colin Kolles (Jordan); and Paul Stoddart (Minardi).

Ferrari was not represented, despite the fact that the team's own office was right next door. Charlie Whiting was summoned, made a brief appearance to state the FIA's case, and left. Apart from that, the FIA was not present. But Max Mosley made regular contributions from the other end of a phone line, speaking to Bernie, George and Briatore.

I went along to doorstep at around 9:45am, to be ready to gather reactions when everyone emerged. A crowd of photographers and TV crews had gathered, with the same idea. Little did we know that it would be a wait of nearly two hours.

Fortunately, there was some interesting comings and goings, and the fact that some of the inside action was visible through the tinted glass helped the time pass. The main meeting area was mostly masked by partitions, but whenever anyone came out to make a phone call or a have a quick side discussion, they had nowhere to hide.

Here's how some of the action unfolded in front of my eyes as time marched on:
10:30am: Bernie leaves the main meeting and gets in a huddle with Stoddart and Kolles. He appears to be doing all the talking.
10:37am: Ecclestone emerges from the office. He briefly teases the waiting media before heading straight next door to Ferrari. He meets Todt.
10:43am: Ecclestone returns to the meeting.
10:50am: Tony George leaves, a look of exasperation on his face. He says nothing to the media. He doesn't come back.
10:58am: Frank Williams is escorted into the meeting by his personal assistant. He's usually a late arrival at the circuit, but it's a surprise to realise that he wasn't already there.
11:03am: Ecclestone and Briatore step out of the main meeting area for a private chat. Flavio is animated.
11:07am: Against expectations, the drivers suddenly appear. They've been in the drivers' briefing and have been called to the meeting by Ecclestone. Fernando Alonso leads the queue, but he wrong slots and heads up the paddock stairs. David Coulthard sees me and says, 'Is this Bernie's office?' One by one, the others follow him in. All except the Ferrari drivers.
11:09am: After a quick trip to the Ferrari office - presumably to seek the approval of Todt - Rubens Barrichello enters the meeting. He shakes hands with Juan Pablo Montoya. Michael follows a minute later and is welcomed by BAR's Nick Fry. Almost immediately Michael heads out again and returns to the Ferrari office. Has he had second thoughts?
11:12am: Michael is back, looking very nonchalant with hands in pockets. Ferrari team manager and sporting director Stefano Domenicali follows him in. Briatore appears to be doing most of the talking to the group of drivers. The Ferrari guys reportedly say that they personally have no problem with a chicane. Nick Heidfeld stands on a chair so he can see what's going on.
11:17am: Kimi Raikkonen leaves the meeting, to be followed by most of the other drivers. A handful stays behind to continue the discussions.
11.27am: It appears to be all over, as the team bosses leave. Only the two Michelin men stay behind, for a brief private chat, before they too bale out. Most of the participants say nothing and head straight back to their own offices.

[Dylan]

Not that anyone knew exactly what to say, except Paul Stoddart, who as usual acted as a de facto spokesman for the group. He claimed that the race would go ahead with nine teams with a chicane - possibly with non-Championship status - or with two cars without a chicane.

Paul StoddartHis Wednesday statement detailed how desperate things were getting in that meeting: "Most present felt the only option was to install the chicane and race, if necessary, without Ferrari, but with 18 cars, in what would undoubtedly be a non-Championship race. We discussed with Bernie the effects of the FIA withdrawing its staff, and agreed among ourselves a race director, a safety car driver, and other essential positions, and all agreed that, under the circumstances, what was of paramount importance was that the race must go ahead. All further agreed that since we would most likely be denied FIA facilities, such as scales and post-race scrutineering, every competitor would instruct his team and drivers to conduct themselves in the spirit of providing an entertaining race for the good of F1."

We now had exactly an hour before the pitlane opened and the cars were scheduled to head out on to the grid. This was utter madness. It was obvious that there was now no time to do anything, and yet some key people seemed convinced that the chicane would have to happen, and that work was about to start.

Bumping into ITV's Jim Rosenthal, I suggested he ought to send a crew out to Turn 13 to see what was happening. "They're already there," he said. "And nothing is going on."

Up and down the paddock there were little huddles. Briatore was again in animated conversation, this time with Norbert Haug and FIA's Alan Donnelly, Max Mosley's key advisor and his eyes and ears at races. Flavio then took Donnelly to one side. The Brit seemed to be doing little else but using those ears.

At 12:03pm Bernie appeared at the 'poor' end of the paddock and talked briefly to Kolles, and then to Stoddart. Fry, Tomita and Horner joined in the latter gathering. Such discussions were now going on in public. Bernie looked pretty hassled. "It's nobody's fault," he muttered as he headed off.

Another meeting was convened in Bernie's office as the minutes ticked away, and it was clear that there was going to be no easy resolution. When 12:30pm came around, there came the sound of an engine firing up. It was Jordan's Tiago Monteiro, heading to the grid. Over the next couple of minutes, he was joined by Schumacher, Barrichello and Narain Karthikeyan. Clearly, Jordan wasn't party to any boycott agreement with the other eight teams represented in the earlier meeting. All the other drivers sat strapped in their cars in the garages.

Back at Bernie's office, things were really getting desperate. Red Bull team manager David Stubbs arrived and put his head round the door. What am I supposed to with my cars, he seemed to be asking? Finally, at 12:38pm, the bosses emerged once more.

"We are all going to the grid, anyway," said Toyota's John Howett. He didn't elaborate. Briatore looked more upset than ever, while Stoddart was seething. His thoughts about Kolles were certainly not for printing. After the race the Jordan boss said that he'd agreed merely that he would race, with or without the chicane.

It was a strange atmosphere on the grid, with more urgent conversations going on. The drivers already knew that they were only going to trundle round. Some of them were sorely tempted to do more that. Ron Dennis had both his hands on Kimi Raikkonen's shoulders, and was giving him a serious eyeball-to-eyeball pep talk. These guys have it in their blood to go racing on Sunday afternoons, and what they were faced with just didn't compute. They were as much victims as anyone else.

Interviewed live by ITV's Martin Brundle on the grid, Bernie had a chance to set the record straight, apologise on behalf of F1 for the unfortunate situation that had arisen, even if it is out of his control. But his evasive replies shed little light - he really didn't seem to know what to say.

The rest, you know.

Conclusion

Max Mosley has given his reasons for not allowing a chicane to be built, and some of them are very valid. In normal circumstances, a sport has to stick to its rules. However, the balance of opinion, to use the sort of phrase that Max often employs himself, is that the reasons in favour of a chicane were far more pressing.

Chief among his objections is that he didn't want to do anything to inconvenience the Bridgestone teams. But he says the whole business was nothing to do with Ferrari, and in turn Jean Todt says that it's the FIA's job to sort these things out, and nothing to do with him. Which of course is quite true, in theory.

After the race I asked Todt if he had spoken to Max over the weekend.

"I spoke with him, yes. But I wasn't the only one, I think everybody spoke with him."

So did Max want to know what he thought of the chicane?

"You know, I mean, Max has a very strong personality, and he has his people with whom he discusses, he has the director of the race, he has the clerk of the course, he has the stewards. I mean, to the question did I speak to him, I spoke with, yes."

But, I insisted, did Max ask if Ferrari would be happy with the chicane?

"No... He never asked me if we would be happy because he never thought that it was a possibility."

Fair enough, and you can't blame the guy for throwing up his hands and saying, it's not my problem.

But let's suspend reality and suppose that, early on Sunday morning, Todt had said something like the following to Max: 'I really don't want to do this, but the USA is our biggest market, Philip Morris is American, Shell are huge here. And Bridgestone/Firestone has had a lot of grief in the States over the past few years. The tifosi are not going to like this either. Remember Austria? I can see all this landing on my head, and Luca di Montezemolo is going to go ballistic if we get the blame. We just can't be seen to screw F1 up. So let's give them the chicane. I think we can beat them anyway."

If such generosity sounds far-fetched, what if he was able to add the following rider: "They've said they're going to give us all the points. How can we sort that out?"

If Todt had made such a suggestion, would Max Mosley really have found it so necessary to stick to his guns?

I suspect that Sunday was clouded by confusion over what was really on offer, and by whom. As noted, in his 3:30pm press briefing on Saturday, Ron Dennis was talking about putting the six Bridgestone cars at the front in return for use of the Barcelona tyres. Not much of a deal, really.

But by the next morning, with the clock ticking, the stakes had been raised so much that there was talk of the Michelin teams racing for no points. But did the message get through? Absolutely not, I can confirm. I asked Todt after the race, and he confirmed that he had never heard that particular version.

"Bernie came this morning to see me with different proposals, including a chicane, but again it's a matter of the FIA, it's not a matter of the commercial rights holder. And I said for me, it's up to the FIA to decide.

"I heard that the teams were prepared to offer the Bridgestone teams to start in front, but I mean it's completely nonsense. We did qualifying yesterday for the starting order."

Crucially, Todt confirmed that no other team principals had approached him or made any offers. Everything was thus channelled through Bernie.

This then begs the question, what did Bernie Ecclestone really say to Jean Todt in their six minute chat that began at 10:37am? Did he fully convey what the teams were offering? If not then, how much (if any) contact did the pair have about other potential compromises as the day went on?

On Sunday afternoon I was convinced that Bernie Ecclestone was as helpless as the rest of us in all this, that he had to a degree been publicly humiliated, and as someone said, made to look like an Emperor with no clothes. This time, it was the rest of the teams and Bernie, versus Max and Ferrari. Surely, I thought, the relationship between Mosley and Ecclestone was now irretrievably out of balance.

I'm still inclined to that view, but was it really the case? Let's take a conspiracy theorist's view and just suppose that Bernie was, as so often in the past, playing the long game. The Indy situation just happened to break in the middle of a heated political battle, and while he appeared to be pushing one cause, perhaps in the background he was pursuing quite different ends. Just a theory, but it makes you think, doesn't it?